INTRODUCTION
There is a major debate in the literature whether China can become a new world hegemonic power in the 21 st century. In this paper we provide a critical assessment of China's possible rise to global political-economic preeminence with a focus on macro-political dimensions of world hegemony building processes. Although there is a flourishing literature Republic of China (PRC) today is emerging as a champion of preservation of the global geopolitical status quo. Put differently, in contrast to previous and current world hegemonic powers, the contemporary Chinese government is not interested at all in transforming the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system and creating instabilities at different levels.
On the contrary, the PRC's foreign policy has consistently been concerned with preserving the inter-state system created by the declining world hegemonic power. That is why even if China maintains its economic strength and gains the economic leadership of the world in the 21 st century by providing a temporary solution to the contemporary crisis of capitalist worldeconomy, it will be not be leading a new inter-state system. It will be leading the existing interstate system established by the U.S 1 .
In the current literature, it is possible to find arguments explaining China's policy of preserving stability in terms of unique ideological and historically specific aspects of Chinese culture. In this paper, however, we offer another explanation that arises from our comparativehistorical analysis. Our explanation focuses on a particular political problem surrounding China during its ascendancy that had not existed, at least on this scale, for previous rising hegemonic powers: During its economic ascendancy, we maintain, Chinese territorial integrity was being challenged due to rapid escalation of nationalist/secessionist movements (e.g. the long standing Taiwanese problem, the Tibet movement, the East Turkestan/Uyghur movement in the Xinjiang 1 For this reason, thus far, China has not been following the footsteps of previous and current world-hegemonic powers. If we need a historical analogy, the current path China follows is more similar to the path followed by Genoese merchant-traders of the mid-fifteenth century who established a "political exchange" with the Iberian kings. In this Genoese-Iberian systemic cycle of accumulation, which was a non-hegemonic period of capitalist world economy spanning from the mid-fifteenth century to the mid-sixteenth century, the Genoese "capitalists" were the economic motor of the capitalist world economy, whereas Iberian powers were the geopolitical and territorial motor (see Arrighi 1994) . Of course, China's current path is also different from the Genoese merchanttraders in key respects. In contrast to the Genoese merchant-traders in the 15 th century, for instance, the state apparatus and military power of contemporary China is not weak but very strong. Consequently, in contrast to the Genoese-Iberian "political exchange," contemporary China does not leave world affairs completely at the hands of the U.S., but it also pressures the U.S. not to alter and disturb the geopolitical configuration of the current interstate system. region, and to a lesser extent the Inner Mongolia problem and growing dissent in newly integrated Hong Kong). While none of these problems are new, a complex set of factors that are also related to the "rise of China" -including multifaceted transformations that occurred during the reform period in the PRC (e.g., liberalization and "opening up" policies; growing energy needs) and complex transformations that have been taking place in the US-centered world hegemonic order (e.g. decline of US hegemony, intensification of inter-state rivalries, and growing social and political instability in the world) -have been making China more and more vulnerable to these internal threats and challenges.
We argue that escalation of nationalist/secessionist movements during China's ascendancy have been pushing the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to utilize a twodimensional strategy that is closely related to China's growing political-economic strength. The first dimension is heavy reliance on development and welfare policies to contain nationalist problems at home and abroad. The second dimension is the skillful use of international diplomacy against forces of secessionist nationalism, which is a feasible option thanks to China's growing bargaining power in bilateral and multilateral relations. Both dimensions of this strategy require and favor global stability. Consequently, contrary to previous hegemonic powers, China has been emerging as a global power which does not attempt to alter the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system but one which attempts to preserve the status quo.
In pursuit of discussing various implications of this "anomalous" development in a comparative-historical perspective, this paper is organized as follows. The first section explains the comparative-historical rationale behind our premises by discussing trajectories of the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States with a focus on the macro-political aspects of world hegemony building processes. The second section examines the historical trajectory of nationalist movements in China before and after the reform period to describe the historically-specific context the PRC finds itself in the early 21st century. The third section discusses the two-dimensional strategy the PRC has been utilizing to contain nationalism in the reform period and explains how and why China has been emerging as a champion of the global status quo. The fourth section concludes by comparing the trajectory we observe in China today with the trajectories of the previous rising hegemonic powers in world history.
MACRO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF WORLD HEGEMONY BUILDING PROCESSES
The concept of "world hegemony" refers to "the power of a state to exercise functions of leadership and governance over a system of sovereign states" (Arrighi 1994: 27) . In this Gramscian re-conceptualization, power is associated not only with dominance but also with the exercise of intellectual and moral leadership. At the world-systemic level, as Arrighi explains, a particular state exercises this hegemonic function when it leads a system of states in pursuit of a perceived general interest. Although terms like general interest are extremely ambiguous because of their ideological nature, historically, claims of this kind tend to increase their credibility under conditions of "systemic chaos," where rising hegemonic powers -and their rivals for that matter -contend to be the leaders in resolving a multiplicity of crises whose devastating economic, social and political consequences are faced by many actors in the interstate system (Arrighi and Silver 1999) .
Among these crises, we can count catastrophic economic and social upheavals which signal that existing regimes of capitalist accumulation are no longer sustainable, escalation of inter-great power (and inter-imperialist) warfare which quickly turns into a negative-sum game for all of its participants and intensification of massive social conflicts, revolts and revolutions (Arrighi & Silver 1999; Silver & Slater 1999; Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000; Amin et al 1982; Arrighi et al 1989) . In this chaotic atmosphere, rising hegemonic powers attempt to resolve these crises by offering new configurations for historical capitalism, state-society relationships and inter-state systems (Arrighi 1994; Arrighi & Silver 1999; Silver & Slater 1999) . These reconfigurations and transformations help rising hegemonic powers not only climb the ladders of global political and economic preeminence but also assert and advance their "intellectual and moral leadership" capacities.
One of the important -yet relatively much less studied -aspects of these transformations is related to the integration of new nations into the inter-state system. Historically, the rise of social and political movements demanding independent statehood, recognition and integration into the inter-state system have been an integral part of the systemic chaos which had marked each hegemonic transition period (Karataşlı 2013; Silver & Slater 1999) . Using the opportunity structures created by economic, social and political crisis conditions of the hegemonic transition periods, state-seeking movements challenge their rulers in a much stronger way (Karataşlı 2013). Historically, climbing the ladders of global-economic preeminence, rising hegemonic powers have led a particular section of these movements to independence by supporting them either directly or indirectly. This helped these great powers increase their consent-making capacities, gain the leadership of a new system of states and constitute themselves as hegemonic powers.
The Rise of the United Provinces to World Hegemony
For instance, the rise of the United Provinces to global political-economic preeminence -which occurred between the mid-16th and the mid-17th centuries (Arrighi 1994 ) -coincided with the partial dissolution of the Spanish-Habsburg empire and the emergence of various stateseeking movements within Europe (Elliott 1970; Elliott 1997; Elliott 2002; Kamen 2005; Karataşlı 2013 ). The seventeen provinces of the Low Countries -which later became the Dutch Republic -were the pioneers of these state-seeking movements when they started a revolt against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire that is currently known as the Dutch War of Independence. The eighty-year long struggle of the Dutch against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire and the establishment of the United Provinces as a de facto independent state in the course of this struggle became an admired model for various regions of the Spanish-Habsburg empire (Silver & Slater 1999; Elliott 1970) . By 1640 different forms of social revolts aiming at establishing independent political units took place in Catalonia, newly incorporated Portugal, Andalusia, Sicily and Naples, and Bohemia (Elliott 1970; Boswell & Chase-Dunn 2000; Tilly 1994 ). Within the social and political turmoil of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, many Protestant revolts also turned into state-seeking movements (Karataşlı 2013).
In the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the "Dutch" provinces contributed to the existing systemic instabilities by actively leading the revolts against the Spanish-Habsburg Empire, riding the tiger of Calvinism, and financing the Protestant popular revolts all over the Europe (Parker & Smith 1978: 18; Parker 1978: 65; Lachmann 2000: 161-162; Arrighi 1994: 47) . The Dutch statesmen quickly realized that in order to gain their independence and to advance their political-economic power they needed to polarize international politics by leading a large coalition of dynastic states against the Spanish-Habsburg empire and towards the liquidation of the medieval system of rule (Parker 1978; Arrighi 1994: 43 (Parker 1978: 71) . The Peace of Westphalia of 1648, which marked the end of both the Eighty Years' War and the Thirty Years' War, not only created the first interstate system of the modern world but also forced the defeated great powers to recognize new states -such as the United Provinces and Switzerland -as independent units of this system. This strategy helped the United Provinces in a number of ways. For one thing, it contributed to the partial dissolution of the Spanish-Habsburg Empire and weakened the Holy Roman Empire, which were among the primary rival great powers for the United Provinces.
While weakening its rivals, the same process had integrative effects on the Seventeen Provinces. Previously the "Seventeen Provinces" were nothing more than a loosely coordinated, heterogeneous collection of autonomous city-states. Thanks to long struggle against the Habsburgs and the extremely high level of capital they started to accumulate, however, "the United Provinces" became a hybrid kind of organization which was much more than a collection of city-states, but still less than a centralized nation state, incorporating characteristics from both (Arrighi 1994: 36-47) . Moreover, in the course of its struggle against the SpanishHabsburg Empire, the United Provinces advanced its leadership capacities over a large number of states -especially the Protestant ones -in Europe. Bringing together new sovereign states of Europe under the Westphalian system and dissolving medieval system of rule in Europe helped the United Provinces to become the hegemonic power in the 17th century.
The Rise of the United Kingdom to World Hegemony
The transition from Dutch to British hegemony, which took place between the late 18th and early 19th centuries, coincided with the development of another wave of state-seeking movements in the modern world-system. This time, state-seeking movements were concentrated especially in the settler colonies of the Americas (Karataşlı 2013:228-241) . Thirteen colonies in North America revolted against the British Empire and gained their independence in 1776. The American War of Independence was a major event signaling the upcoming crises in the geopolitical and macroeconomic sphere (Silver and Slater 1999:159-160 Venezuela during this hegemonic consolidation period. As a whole, the period from the 1770s to the 1820s marked the first major wave of decolonization in modern world history (see Figure   1 , below). In this era, the rise of nationalist movements was not confined to settler colonies. In the late 18th and early 19th century, the Serbian, Greek and Romanian populations of the Ottoman Empire and the Irish in the British Empire also started their wars of national liberation. Henige (1970) . See Bergesen and Schoenberg (1980) for the original study on long waves of colonialism and decolonization using Henige's (1970) data. Five year aggregates for successful decolonization activities are shown. Post-1970 instances of decolonization are updated at http://www.irows.ucr.edu/cd/appendices/socchange/data/colanddecol.xls, last retrieved August 31, 2015 Compared to the United Provinces, which had to gain its independence and move toward further integration during the crisis of the late 16th and early 17th century, the British Empire was more concerned with protecting its territorial/imperial integrity against forces of nationalism in the midst of the crisis of the late 18th century. Hence in comparison, the British Empire was more hesitant than its counterpart to support national liberation movements that could trigger instability in the world, a tactic which could backfire and harm the Empire. In its rise to world hegemony, the British Empire had already lost an important part of its American colonies and was struggling to suppress the revolt by the United Irishmen. Hence, in Europe, the British statesmen quickly realized the benefits of a conservative coalition with the Holy Bolsheviks saw the liberation of all subject nations and oppressed colonial peoples as an important asset for world revolution as well (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 148) . The right of nations to self determination was a main theme of the East People's Congress in Baku (1920) and this soon became a principle of "the (Third) International" (Blunden 1977 (Blunden [2013 In reality, US support, or at least neutrality, in the struggles of the national liberation movements did accelerate the tendency toward decolonization in certain areas of particular economic and strategic importance (the Middle-East, India, Indonesia)" (Arrighi 1978: 94) .
The United States' decolonization policy was also related to the containing the forces of communism. During the U.S. world hegemony, both the USSR and the United States started to compete with each other in order to penetrate their sphere of influence into the colonial world and apply the notion of self-determination to the colonial nations. Gradually, "national liberation" turned into a synonym for anti-colonialism. From 1945 onwards, the world saw the second wave of decolonization in modern world history (see Figure 1 ). Because the United
States was not a major colonial power itself, it did not have much to lose in defending the decolonization of former imperial powers. On the contrary this was an integral part of US hegemonic consolidation. In addition, through admitting the newly independent nations into the newly established "United Nations," and promising them economic growth and development, the US not only increased its intellectual and moral leadership within the non-Western world, but also created a favorable environment for capitalist development. The period from 1945 to 1970 became a period of material expansion, whose two main pillars were decolonization and the development project (Silver & Slater 1999: 209; McMichael 2012; Harvey 2003:58) .
TRAJECTORY OF STATE-SEEKING NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN CHINA DURING THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY
China's rise as a global political-economic power in recent decades, however, does not fit into this trend. Unlike the rise of the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States, China's ascendancy does not coincide with attempts to restructure the existing configuration of the inter-state system. On the contrary, as of now China has been preoccupied with providing stability and preserving the global status quo. Of course, this trend is not yet complete and, thus, there is no guarantee that China's policies will not change in the near future 4 . Although large generalizations and deductions out of a process which is not over would not be wise, there are also reasons to believe that a combination of structural macro-political dynamics have been pushing China to preserve the status quo in the world. These dynamics are complex and multifaceted. Within the spatial limits of this paper and following the framework we introduce below, we will mainly focus on a particular portion of these aspects: increasing 4 A number of US policy makers, including Robert Kaplan (2005) , believe that rise of China cannot be and will not be a peaceful one. Likewise, in the Chinese Communist Party too "there are people who feel that speaking of a peaceful rise gives the message to the United States and Taiwan that they can impudently push China around" (Arrighi 2007:292) .
vulnerability of Chinese territorial unity due to the rise of state-seeking nationalist movementswithin China and around the world -during the reform era.
The territorial contraction was reversed and territorial re-unification was by and large completed 5 Tibet became a de facto independent state from 1913 to 1951 but its sovereignty was never internationally recognized (Nathan & Scobell 2012:199) .
with the 1949 revolution (see Figure 2) . In short, China entered the period of US hegemony as a
unitary (yet multinational) republic 6 . KMT in its revolutionary struggle in the course of the 1940s -was abandoned in favor of a system of Regional Autonomy of Minority Nationality Regions in a Unified China (Connor 6 Unlike the USSR (United Soviet Socialist Republics), which was a federal republic that (at least theoretically and ideologically) depended upon the "voluntary" union of "independent soviet republics". 1984; also see Xingwu 1988:136-7; Bockman 1992:186-7) . In this period the CCP offered a wide range of socio-economic, political and administrative privileges to the autonomous regions and it was careful not to impose a one-size-fits-all system which ignored regional differences and "sensitivities" in the implementation of the socialist transformation ( Note: 'Years with Peripheral Nationalist Warfare in China' is from Wimmer and Min (2006) . Years in which there was a nationalist secessionist warfare in China is shown with light grey shades. 'Frequency of Major Nationalist Movements' is from State-Seeking Nationalist Movements (SSNM) database by Karataşlı (2013) . Karataşlı (2013) uses the Guardian and the New York Times newspaper archives to estimate the peaks and troughs nationalist mobilization. Hence, while interpreting the frequency of major nationalist movements indicator, the attention must be paid to relative peaks and troughs rather than their absolute levels. Three year moving average is used in the frequency of major nationalist movements. The information provided for the waves are examples of important events that take place during these periods. Taiwan is not included in the figure.
This rising tide of nationalist unrest was countered with the launch of the Cultural Revolution (Bockman 1992:190) . In Tibet, the Lama monasteries -which also served as the organizational centers for the national movements -were destroyed and religious activities were proscribed (Donnet 1994; Nathan & Scobell 2012:200) . Likewise, in Xinjiang, thousands of mosques, shrines and Koranic schools were closed, public prayer was banned, and religious and cultural leaders were taken from their positions (Minahan 2002 (Minahan :1962 .
Nationalist Unrest in China During the Reform Era
Launch of the Cultural Revolution heralded a period of decline in nationalist movements 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936 1940 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 Years in China's minority regions but it did not end nationalist aspirations in these contentious regions for good. On the contrary, while impeding nationalist-secessionist movements, the Cultural Revolution also had a long-term impact of creating memories of repression, which has been important in the organization of the post-1980 wave of nationalist movements in China. Rising state-seeking nationalist movements in China today are not simply confined to the Tibetan and Xinjiang regions either. Arguably, Beijing's greatest problem today is Taiwan.
In contrast to other national problems, "Taiwan is more than just a problem of territorial integrity: it is the site of a rival Chinese government" (Nathan & Scobell 2012:212) 
UNDERSTANDING THE PRC'S STRATEGY OF CONTAINING NATIONALISM
"Even as China's global influence increases," Nathan and Scobell observe, "it is bedeviled to an unusual degree for a major power by what political scientists call 'problems of stateness '" (2012: 195) . These problems are further aggravated by the geo-political-economic significance of and variation within these nationalist movements. Claimed territories by Tibet and Xinjiang alone account for almost one-third of the PRC's total area. With a GDP per capita level of $4,200, Tibet is among the poorest provinces in China. Xinjiang's GDP per capita level ($6,000) is slightly below mainland China's average per capita income ($6,700) 9 . Although these regions are not among the better off regions, they contain important mines and energy sources that China increasingly needs (Dreyer 2003:412; Becquelin 2004:365) . For China, losing Tibet and Xinjiang means losing access to major gold, copper, coal and oil reserves as well as gas reserves and major potential for hydroelectric energy (see Lafitte 2013; Nathan & Scobell 2012:199) . In contrast to Tibet and Xinjiang, Taiwan and Hong Kong function as the cash-boxes of the 21st century. With GDP per capita levels of $21,000 and $38,000 respectively, these two major trading partners have huge economic and strategic importance for China. Because of these complexities, the Chinese government's strategy to contain these rising nationalist forces in the reform period radically differs from its earlier policies. This is a two dimensional strategy, which is closely related to China's rising economic strength in the last decades. The first dimension is related to the heavy reliance on development and welfare policies to solve these nationalist problems. Especially in its peripheral regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang, China has been trying to gain the consent of rebellious ethnic minorities through its "Go West policy," and more specifically through introduction of development projects, construction of roads, highways, airports and promotion of policies friendly to businesses and foreign investors, and provision of various services, gifts and privileges (Goldstein 2004 
Preserving the Global Status Quo?
Of course, China is not the first country to use international diplomacy and bilateral trade relations to promote stability at home. All states are pragmatic actors that engage in various sorts of coalitions and agreements to prevent international support of nationalist secessionist movements, any kind of revolutionary activities, anti-governmental movements or terrorism directed at themselves. Yet in most cases, the same pragmatic interests and consequences of bilateral negotiations also push states not only to condemn these sorts of movements but also to support some of them in different places. As we discussed in Section 1, this was also true in the case of rising hegemonic powers.
This is where the case of the PRC starts to become more interesting. Given the complex set of relationships between the political-economic transformation in China, the rise of secessionist nationalist movements in Chinese territories, and the macro-political context in the world, China's efforts to contain nationalism at home and its attitude in international diplomacy make us believe that China's efforts to build a coalition of anti-secessionist movements has consequences that transcend its territorial boundaries. These structural conditions seem to be pushing China to preserve the global status quo in a very consistent manner. (Njoku 2010:354) . In 1998, the US government bombed a suspected site known as Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory, assuming that the place was used for chemical weapons and connected to Al Qaeda. But in the midst of all these tensions, there was another element that was becoming critical.
Sudan was becoming a key location for Chinese economic growth. China obtained 10%
of its oil from Sudan and owned multi-billion dollar investments which were concentrated mainly in the oil sector. And as in the case of Iran, Chinese energy needs and deals were creating further tensions with the USA (Harvey 2003:139) . As the South Sudanese movement was becoming more powerful, China was becoming nervous about the separation of the Sudan.
Since 2001, the secession of South Sudan was on the global agenda (Kock 2011:506) . Parallel to these developments, the atrocities in Sudan were becoming a global human rights problem with "Save Darfur" campaigns and there was a strong Western coalition supporting the South Sudanese right to self-determination. The UN Security Council planned to organize a military intervention to Sudan but these plans were prevented by China, which used its veto power against these operations (Njoku, 2010:354) . From the beginning to the end, China attempted to preserve the unity of Sudan. In 2011, during the height of the conflicts, China first tried to play the role of the mediator. After the 2011 referendum when South Sudan seceded from Sudan, China tried to do its best to establish trade relationships with South Sudan as well.
As also confirmed by the recent Crimean crisis, contemporary China is not willing to support any secessionist or irredentist activity that would create further instabilities. We do not know for sure if this consistent policy can continue in near future. As of now, however, the CCP thinks that there is nothing much they can gain from supporting nationalist movements and encouraging changing the configuration of the interstate system. Its rising economic power already provides China an important degree of bargaining power vis-a-vis other great powers.
This tendency is the opposite of the case of the United States. Paradoxically, in the same hegemonic transition process, it is not the rising economic power but the declining hegemon which tries very hard to alter the political geography of the inter-state system to regain its hegemonic position. Since the collapse of the USSR, the United States has been using all opportunities to demonstrate that it is still the greatest military power in the world (Harvey 2003; Arrighi 2007 ). That's probably why starting with the First Gulf War, the US government led a number of "humanitarian missions" and interventions around the world (Arrighi 2007:178-180) . From then until 9/11, US forces enthusiastically took part in the First Gulf War of 1990 -91, "Humanitarian Crisis" in Somalia 1992 , "Humanitarian Operation" in Bosnia (1992 at the forefront, we can also add the Libya intervention of 2011 to this long list. For our purposes it is important to underline that without exception in all of these territories, we can find strong nationalist or autonomist movements. Some of these movements managed to gain their independence (e.g. Kosovo), de facto autonomy or federal governments (e.g. Kurds in
Northern Iraq) after the US-led military operations and they established closer relationships with the US government afterwards.
Not surprisingly, in most of these cases, the US also found its interests in direct conflict with those of China
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. Hence China's support for the global status quo can also be seen as direct 10 A similar tendency -to alter the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system in order to gain resistance against US interests as well. As Arrighi (2007) also pointed out, the imperialist ambitions of the United States -such as the "War on Terror" -have already provided a space for China not only to advance its economic power but also to increase its consent-production capacities. It can be argued that the ability to counterbalance US imperial ambitions and to provide international macro-political stability would itself be evidence of China's increasing intellectual and moral leadership (hence "hegemonic") capacities. In his "Rising Star: China's New Security Concept," for instance, Bates Gill (2007) argued that through a combination of pragmatic security policies, growing economic clout, and increasingly deft diplomacy, China has established productive and increasingly solid relationships throughout Asia and around the globe, to include new partnerships in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Europe, Africa and South America. While these developments predate September 11, 2001, they have unfolded at a time of strategic preoccupation on the part of the United States, both in military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the global counterterrorism campaign. This last, in turn, has opened strategic space for China to expand its influence at both regional and global levels" (Gill 2007:1) This can be seen as an example for how China advances its intellectual and moral leadership capacities through protection of the global status quo.
CONCLUSION: MACRO-POLITICAL ASPECTS OF CHINA'S ASCENT IN COMPARATIVE-HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
power vis-a-vis its rivals -is also clear in the case of contemporary Russia, which has been supporting independence movements in many post-Soviet states including Georgia (e.g. South Ossetia and Abkhazia) and Ukraine (e.g. Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk) in order to incorporate them or to expand Russia's influence over these regions. Indeed, annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014 became the first instance of annexation by a European power since the end of World War II.
It was Mao who once said "the world is in chaos, the situation is excellent". Today, the world seems to be entering into a period of chaos once again but the contemporary CCP's evaluation of the situation is quite the opposite. This is more so when we consider the escalation of nationalist movements in recent decades. Similar to previous hegemonic transition periods, during the decline of the US hegemony, the world experienced rapid intensification of stateseeking nationalist movements (Karataşlı 2013). But China considers these movements neither as a potential for revolution nor as a tool to gain global supremacy.
In the literature, one can find a wide spectrum of explanations for China's desire to protect the status quo ranging from existence of ancient philosophical traditions to the dissolution of communist ideology, from a conscious strategy of a "peaceful ascent" (heping jueqi) to the memories of its historic humiliation during the Opium Wars. In this paper, however, we offered an alternative perspective by examining the complex set of relationships surrounding the revival of nationalist movements in China and the PRC's attempts to contain them nationally and internationally. We argued that if China is slowly emerging as a protector of the integrity of the existing sovereign states of the current inter-state system, this is because China's own domestic problems and vulnerabilities have been pushing it to play this role globally. After all, global political-economic stability is a key both for sustaining China's economic growth and its territorial stability 11 .
In this concluding section, we discuss the possible implications of this trajectory for
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We must note that these processes are also reinforced by other global-level political-economic developments that we cannot address here due to space limitations. Let us suffice to mention that Chinese corporations are still the beneficiary of the existing capitalist world economy hence they do not want any instabilities that would risk their profits. Considering that the current world hegemonic power does not have vast colonies to be liquidated, China does not have much to gain economically or politically by using the same liquidation strategy of the previous and current world hegemonic powers. Furthermore, the contemporary phase of "globalization" and "financialization" seems to have intensified socio-economic linkages and interlocked U.S. and Chinese corporations in the global commodity chain, making China very unwilling to disturb existing relationships. hegemony-building processes. As we argued in the first section, in their rise to world hegemony all previous hegemonic powers -the United Provinces, the United Kingdom and the United States -aimed to reconfigure the world by leading a particular section of these movements to independence by supporting them directly and indirectly for very pragmatic purposes. These strategies helped them increase their leadership capacities on the one hand and present themselves as champions of a "more progressive" inter-state system reconfiguration on the other hand. If China is rising as a great power which attempts to preserve the status quo in a highly consistent manner, what does this trend mean in terms of the prospects and limits of China's ascendancy?
First of all, we must note that none of the previous hegemonic powers (or rival great powers for that matter) were faced with increasing centrifugal forces within their nation during their respective ascendancies on the scale China is facing today. For the United Provinces and the United States, the tendency was the opposite. In the course of their rise to world hegemony, they became more united than before. In the course of the Eight Years' War, the United Provinces became a new unit, which was no longer a collection of seventeen city-states.
Likewise, on the eve of US material expansion and before its bid for world hegemony, the Northern states of "the United States" crushed secessionist movements in the South. The American Civil War not only smashed state-seeking aspirations by brute force but also made "the United States" more united than before: As they say, "before the war, it was said 'the United States are'. After the war, people started to say 'the United States is.
"
The case of the United Kingdom was rather different. As we already discussed, the loss 12 Interestingly, today, when Chinese authorities talk with US authorities on "sensitive matters" such as the Tibet or Taiwan problems, they often underline that they are taking the United States of the 1860s as their role model and they are doing nothing but following the teachings of the USA, especially those of Abraham Lincoln (Wong 2009; Wong 2012; Wachman 2010). of the thirteen colonies in the last quarter of the 18th century and simultaneous escalation of nationalist movements within its mainland territories (i.e. the Irish movement) made the United Kingdom more vulnerable to nationalist movements than its counterparts and pushed it to establish a conservative coalition with the Holy Alliance to suppress nationalist and patriotic forces in Europe. However, the level of nationalist movements in the United Kingdom was not as high as contemporary China and the existence of vast overseas colonial possessions helped the U.K. contain the Irish problem to a large extent. Thus, when necessary, the United Kingdom was still able to selectively and pragmatically support a large number of national liberation movements in both sides of the Atlantic in its rise to world hegemony.
In contrast to all previous rising hegemonic powers, however, China is facing strong centrifugal forces and secessionist movements in its mainland throughout its ascendancy. In contrast to the United Provinces and the United States, China is not gradually becoming a more unitary political entity during its ascendancy but it needs to implement very elaborate containment mechanisms, policies and principles -such as the "One Country, Two Systems" principle -to maintain its territorial unity. In contrast to the British Empire, which had lost the Thirteen Colonies at an early period of systemic chaos, China has not lost any of its territories but even gained new ones such as Hong Kong and Macao. Also considering that it is not a core state like the United Provinces, the United Kingdom or the United States but a peripheral state rapidly becoming a semiperipheral one, one can see how the structural conditions surrounding contemporary China are categorically different from previous and current world hegemonic powers. Hence how to contain secessionism is a more serious problem than it was for United Provinces, United Kingdom and the United States.
China's territorial vulnerability is not independent from its rapid rise as well. As China climbs the ladder of the world power hierarchy, the United States policy-makers (and those of other great powers as well) are becoming more preoccupied than before with how to counterbalance Chinese power. In this discussion of realpolitik, nationalist problems in China such as Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang, its territorial disputes with neighbors, and rival claims in South China are at the forefront. Although Kaplan's or Mearsheimer's policies have their differences, they all ask a single question: how to use these territorial vulnerabilities to contain the rise of China.
In our analysis, we explained how these problems have been pushing China to increase its leadership capacities in the international sphere to contain secessionism at home. What does this mean for the possibility of China's rise to world hegemony from a macro-political perspective? Of course, our analysis does not tell us whether or not China can rise to global political and economic preeminence in the following decades or sometime in near future.
However, we underline an interesting puzzle. If China continues its political-economic rise in the medium run but fails in coordinating the existing sovereign states for the preserving the global status quo, we argue, it would probably be more difficult to keep its political-territorial unity in the long run. Put differently, although Chinese policy makers make it clear that they do not seek hegemony, these rising territorial vulnerabilities have been pushing China to play the role of a hegemon. Preservation of territorial unity is the primary drive. Without its territorial unity, it will be very difficult to sustain its economic strength. Thus failing to reestablish and to preserve international stability will be a limit to its rise. To contain its internal problems, territorial unity and economic strength, China needs a more stable international order, which requires leading a large number of states in pursuit of providing international stability and countering acts of imperialist aggression (first and foremost the ones increasingly implemented by the United States) which create macro-political instability in the world.
We are skeptical about the plausibility of this scenario where China becomes a new world hegemonic power as we understand the term today. However even if China became a new hegemon, the inter-state system it will be leading would not be a new (a more "progressive", and more "democratic") system. On the contrary, instead of altering the geopolitical configuration of the inter-state system, it will be leading over the former inter-state system established by the previous hegemonic power. Hence, even if this scenario occurred, from a macro-political perspective China's rise to world hegemony will not be a replica of the previous instances of hegemonic transitions but will be a radical and major rupture from the existing patterning we have observed so far. It will be a perfect example of a stalemate -if we may borrow from Antonio Gramsci -in which "the old is dying but the new cannot be born".
